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UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO LICENSE SOFTWARE:
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND
THE NEED FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING*

INTRODUCTION

Common thinking today is that intellectual property
and antitrust law, despite their fundamental conflicts,
complement each other.' The common ground on which these
fields of law stand, however, resembles California's fault lines
more than a peaceful plateau.' The tenuous balance between
the two areas continually shifts according to context and
prevailing policy objectives! An unstable context for balancing
intellectual property and antitrust law emerged with the
increasing importance of technology and the concentration of
technological resources in the hands of a smattering of
companies. Of particular concern are recent antitrust cases
involving a well-established company's refusal to license
software to organizations that service its products.5 In these
© 2002 Catherine Parrish. All Rights Reserved.
Matthew G. Jacobs & Michael S. Mireles, The Intersection of Intellectual
Property and Antitrust Law: In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust
Litigation, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 293, 294-95 (2002); E. Thomas Sullivan, The
Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 1 (2000); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual
Propertyand the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 193 (1999).
2 "[Alt the border of intellectual property monopolies and antitrust markets
lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme Court." Image
Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997). The Ninth
Circuit further noted the "obvious tension" between intellectual property and antitrust
laws. Id. at 1215.
3 See James Langenfeld, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Steps Toward
Striking a Balance, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91 (2001).
4 See
generally Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535
(2001) [hereinafter Unresolved Issues].
6 See Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147 (1st Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the antitrust aspects of these cases see Jacobs
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contexts, litigants and commentators looked primarily to
antitrust provisions for solutions. An alternative approach,
however, lies within copyright law. Examining the proper scope
of a copyright holder's right to exclude provides a better
method of balancing the competing concerns.'
Among the recent antitrust cases, the Federal Circuit
pushed copyright holders' rights further than other courts.7 In
Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation
("Xerox"), the Federal Circuit equated a copyright owner's
exclusive right to a discretionary right to refuse to license one's
work.8 Rather than exploring how the Copyright Act's scheme

of rights and limitations applied to that particular context, the
court relied on questionable dictum from a Lochner era
Supreme Court case to find that the right to exclude is
virtually limitless.9 This decision ignored underlying copyright
policies and upset the balance that the Constitution and
Copyright Act demand." As Robert Pitofsky, former chairman
of the Federal Trade Commission, commented, "recent cases,
and particularly the Federal Circuit's opinion in . . . Xerox,
have upset that traditional balance in a way that has
disturbing implications."" The implications extend beyond who
can service Xerox's copy machines. 2 If the right to exclude is
limitless, then a copyright owner can dominate aftermarkets
such as service, restrict access to ideas, reduce innovation and
harm small businesses."
& Mireles, supra note 1 and Lao, supra note 1.
6 Indeed, the courts have stated that intellectual property laws, not antitrust
provisions, must determine the scope of granted rights. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1216; Xerox,
203 F.3d at 1326.
7 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1328-29.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1328. See also infra notes 118-68 and accompanying text.
10 Defining the right to exclude as virtually limitless undermines the
constitutional mandate that protection be given to promote the arts and ignores the
policies embodied in other Copyright Act limitations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8;
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (codifying fair use as a limitation on exclusive rights). See also
Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service OrganizationsAntitrust Litigation, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323 (2001) (arguing that the Federal Circuit disturbed the
balance of antitrust and intellectual property law).
" Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection
of Antitrust and Intellectual Property,68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 919 (2001).
" The Federal Trade Commission recently conducted a series of hearings to
address licensing problems and recent court decisions. Federal Trade Commission,
Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy, at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2002).
13 See, e.g., Tricom Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 742-744
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, to find that General Motors need not
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A close examination of the American copyright regime
reveals that, in fact, a more limited right to exclude exists.
Copyright law itself is a balancing act between the public good
and a creator's rights. To foster creativity and reward creators,
the public sacrifices some of its access rights to protect a
use.
copyright holder's expression from unauthorized
Maintaining the appropriate balance between the public and
copyright holders is a primary copyright issue for the courts
and Congress. 4 Yet, the scope of protection for new
technologies, particularly software, remains in limbo. 5
Demarcating this scope is fundamental to properly balance
public access and copyright holders' rights.
This Note explores the foundations and developments of
copyright law to argue for recognition of the limitations on the
right to exclude. It examines the Federal Circuit's faulty basis
for finding a limitless right and discusses the viability of
compulsory licenses to balance the competing individual and
public interests. Part I of this Note considers copyright's
historical roots in America and development of the current law.
Part II argues that software is a different kind of expression
than other literary works and, as such, requires specialized
standards. Part III analyzes the recent "refusal to license"
cases with particular attention paid to Xerox. Part IV dissects
the Federal Circuit's foundation for a broad right to exclude
and argues that it is faulty and against public policy. Finally,

license its engineering software to third parties even though General Motors required
outside vendors to use the software for engineering and design services). See also
Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias Against Small Business: Kodak,
Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 231, 280 (2001)
(arguing that the Xerox decision curtailed antitrust law).
14 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). As the Supreme Court expressed:
Congress ... has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors . . .in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work .... this task involves a difficult balance
between the interests of authors ... on the one hand, and society's competing
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other
hand.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See also United
States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1962); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954).
15 Copyright law only protects expression, not function. 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2001). Thus, copyright protection for software is imperfect because it either
overprotects by encompassing the software's function or leaves the function
unprotected. Pitofsky, Unresolved Issues, supra note 4, at 542-43. See also infra notes
48-88 and accompanying text.
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Part V suggests that compulsory license is a mechanism within
copyright law that will curb excessive copyrights.
I.

HISTORY OF AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 6

Copyright law began in the United States in the 1780s. 17
The Constitution gave Congress the power to grant copyrights
"[tio promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings." 8 The grant was discretionary;
Congress had the power, but not the duty, to pass a copyright
law. 9 In fact, Congress did not enact the first copyright statute
until 1790.20 In the interim, the Continental Congress
recommended that states pass copyright laws.2' Following this
recommendation, all but one of the original thirteen states
passed copyright provisions for a renewable fourteen year
term. 2 Most of the state statutes based copyright protection on
16 For a more detailed history of copyright law see RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER,

COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912); L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L.
REV. 119 (1983); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1989); Gary Kauffman,
Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in Copyright Law: Five
Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381 (1986).
17 BOWKER, supra note 16, at
35, 654.
"s U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.07 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.
2001)
[hereinafter NIMMER]. Reading Section 8 of the Constitution as a whole supports this
interpretation. The section begins with "The Congress shall have Power To" and
continues on to list items within that power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. In addition to
granting copyrights, the clause lists creating lower federal courts and declaring war.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 11. Neither of these imposes a duty on Congress. The
clear intent was to allow, but not compel, Congress to pursue these matters if it
deemed necessary. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222 (1909), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT 7 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)
[hereinafter 1909 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] ("The Constitution does not establish
copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it
thinks best.").
20 Act of May 31, 1790 (protecting the author of charts, maps and books),
reprinted in THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
1783-1906, at 32-34 (2d ed., rev. 1906).
21 SOLBERG, supra note 20, at 11-31. The Continental Congress
resolution
recommended that copyright be the "exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending
under such restrictions as to the several States may deem proper." Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 11-31. Delaware was the one state without a copyright statute. Id. at
31. Four state statutes included compulsory license provisions to insure that
copyrighted books were available at reasonable rates. Robert Stephen Lee, An
Economic Analysis of Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
203, 207 n.23 (1982).
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an author's natural rights.28 When Congress enacted the first
federal copyright act, however, it followed the English Statute
of Anne to create a positive right rather than basing the statute
on natural rights. 24 Evidence demonstrates that the founders
intended copyright to be a positive right, not a codification of
any common law rights.28
Still, some commentators argue that natural rights
provided the basis for American copyright law. 26 The primary
support for this contention is Madison's statement in the
Federalist Papers that "[tihe copy right of authors has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common
law." 7 Madison, however, probably mischaracterized the
British right. In 1774, the House of Lords held that at common
law an author did have the right of first printing but that the
Statute of Anne replaced that right, and only the statute could
provide a remedy for infringement. 28 The members of the
Constitutional Convention most likely knew of this decision
and chose to follow it rather than codify a natural right. The
1790 Copyright Act provides further evidence of this
conclusion. The Act stated that it was intended "for the
encouragement of learning"29 -language that copied exactly the

SOLBERG, supra note 20, at 11-31. Eight of the twelve states with copyright
laws expressly stated that the law was based on an author's natural rights. Id. See also
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright For FunctionalExpression, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1149, 121215 (1998).
24 BOWKER, supra note 16, at 23. The Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710,
granted an author the sole right to print his work, provided penalties for infringement
and allowed the officers of the Crown to lower prices if deemed too high. Id. at 6, 24-26.
It was at this point that "[]iterary and like property . . . lost the character of copyright, and became the subject of copy-privilege." Id. at 7.
2" For instance, the Constitutional Convention record
shows that alternate
proposals were presented at the Constitutional Convention: (1) "to secure to literary
authors their copyrights for a limited time;" (2) "to encourage by premiums &
provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge;" and (3) "to secure to Authors
exclusive rights for a certain time." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 325 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). The Constitution reflects a combination of the
latter two rather than the first proposal. The founders balanced public access and a
limited monopoly in the Constitution: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 See, e.g., Kauffman, supra note 16, at 403-08; Weinreb, supra note 23, at
1212.
" Kauffman, supra note 16, at 406; Weinreb, supra note 23, at 1212. See
also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
28
Donaldson v. Beckett, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
29 SOLBERG supra note 20, at 32.
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Statute of Anne."° If Madison argued for a natural law
copyright, the other framers apparently did not agree.
In the 1834 case of Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme
Court decided the issue of whether a common, natural law
copyright existed in America. 3' The Court held that no federal
common law existed under the Copyright Act. Thus, when
Congress enacted the first Copyright Act, it did not sanction an
existing right; it created a new one. 32 While commentators
questioned the Court's finding," the Court maintained in
subsequent decisions that copyright is a statutory grant.34
Congress echoed the Court's holding in Wheaton when it
revised the Copyright Act in 1909. The 1909 revision extended
protection to new technologies and for the first time included
compulsory license provisions.3 As the House Report stated:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms
of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the
author has in his writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such
rights ...are purely statutory... upon the ground that the welfare
of the public will be served .... [niot primarily for the benefit of the

author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are
given.

Some

36

commentators

argue

that

the

purpose

of

these

statements was only to justify the new compulsory licensing

30
31

Kauffman supra note 16, at 404.
33 U.S. 591 (1834). See also L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and "The

Exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N 1, 15-16 (1993).
32 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658, 661. The Court also found that if the state
recognized a common law right, it could protect the work until publication, at which

time the federal statutory right took effect. Id. at 658. State common law continued to
protect works prior to publication until the 1976 Act, which extended federal copyright
to works upon "fixation" rather than 'publication," thereby subsuming the common law
into the statutory right. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). Interestingly, the Court also implied
that courts and commentators agreed that patent holders did not derive their grants
from natural rights. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657-58.
3' GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
4-82
(Freeman & Bolles 1847); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 43-48, 51
(Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1879) (arguing that authors have a natural-law
copyright and that the term limit constituted a taking).
14 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 431 (1984) ("[It [ius
settled that the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory."); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
" Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), reprinted in BOWKER,
supra note 16 at Appendix I.
36 H.R. REP. No. 60-2222 (1909), reprinted in 1909 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 19.
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provision.37 Although the statements do begin the compulsory
licensing section,3" the Report indicated that the Supreme
Court's Wheaton reasoning underlay all copyright laws, not just
compulsory license provisions."9 At the very least, the 1909 Act
demonstrated Congress' intention that the individual right be
balanced against the public good. The Supreme Court
consistently has affirmed that this balance lies at the heart of
copyright protection.4'
Congress again revised the Copyright Act in 1976. This
revision accommodated the drastic technological changes- that
had occurred since 1909, particularly changes to how
copyrighted works were reproduced and exploited. 4 The 1976
Act maintained the same philosophy as the 1909 Act; copyright
law needed to balance individual rights and the public good. 4
Since the beginning of copyright law, commentators
have argued over the priority that should be given to the
individual author's rights vis-A-vis the public. Some, like
Madison, viewed an author's rights and the public good as

" See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 23, at 1215. This first compulsory license
exempted coin-operated machines from liability for public performance when the
establishment did not charge a fee. 8 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 8.17. Under the current
Copyright Act, this exemption changed to permit voluntary negotiations between the
parties. 17 U.S.C. § 116(c) (2000). If negotiated rates are not agreed upon, then a
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel sets the rate until the parties can reach
agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 803(a)(4) (2000).
38 1909 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 19, at 87.
'9 The Report went on to state:
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider.., two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, tinder the proper terms and
conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the
temporary monopoly.
1909 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19, at $7.
40 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
See also
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1962); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954).
41 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2001)). This Act separated copyrightable works into
seven categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings. Congress added
an eighth category, architectural works, in 1990. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1-8). See also
Ronald A. Cass, Copyright, Licensing, and the "FirstScreen", 5 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 35, 40 (1999).
42 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 94th Cong., at 61 (1976),
reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 ("The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright
owner's exclusive rights ... and then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or
exemptions in the [following sections].").
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advocated treating
complementary principles.43 Others
intellectual property no differently than real property and
abolishing term limitations." Still other theorists called for the
abolition of copyright in favor of the public good. 5 The debate
continues today.46 Courts, however, settled on balancing the
individual author's rights with the public good according to the
nature of the work and the congressional grant." Balancing the
competing interests-public access and exclusivity as an
economic incentive to innovate-is the only way to adequately
protect both.
SOFTWARE Is

II.

DIFFERENT THAN TRADITIONAL LITERARY

WORKS

All copyrights are not created equal. The current
Copyright Act specifies different rules depending on the
category of the work.48 A few examples are: (1) term: a private
copyright lasts for the author's life plus seventy years, and a
copyright held by a corporation lasts ninety-five years;49 (2)
'3 James Madison stated regarding the Copyright Clause: "The public good
fully coincides ...

with the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note

27, at 288.

DRONE, supra note 33, at 51-53. See also CURTIS, supra note 33, at 1-25. A
book review of Philip H. Nicklin's REMARKS ON LITERARY PROPERTY quoted the author
44

as saying, "I incline to the belief that authors should have full property in perpetuity;
that is to say, that they, their heirs, and assigns, should possess the entire control over
their works forever." Review of Remarks on Literary Property, 19 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.
476, 477-78 (1838). The editors disagreed. Id. at 478-79, cited in Patterson, supra note
31, at 20 n.52.
45 William Leggett's 1837 editorials called for the abolition of copyright to
further the greatest good for the most people. DEMOCRATICK EDITORIALS: ESSAYS IN
JACKSONIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY BY WILLIAM LEGGET 391-405 (Lawrence H. White

ed., 1984), cited in Weinreb, supra note 23, at 1214 n.276.
46 Compare Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970),
with Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 108 (1990). A common belief is that the term limit alone insures an appropriate
balance. Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses-Are They Coming or Going?,
37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 231, 243 (1990). However, as term limits increase this
protection becomes more illusory, particularly with software, which becomes obsolete
long before the copyright term expires. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 14, at
361-63 (arguing that as the cost of copying decreases, the optimal term of protection
should increase).
47 See supra note 14. See also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 46-47 (1962); Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
48 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
49 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 302(a) & (c) (2000). The life plus seventy years term
the
European copyright term. However, the ninety-five year term for works for
matches
hire is almost twice as long as the European term for similar works. The American
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copying exemptions: certain groups are allowed to make copies
that would be infringement if made by another group;" and (3)
moral rights: these rights attach to certain paintings or
sculptures,5 but not to software or works made for hire."
Congress coupled together such bright line rules and
exceptions as a result of negotiations between the interested
parties.5 3 This structure can result in acutely myopic
interpretations of the statute. However, when the overall
context is considered, the bright lines blur into a workable
standard that balances the competing interests." Overall, the
Act reflects the understanding that the character and use of an
expression alters the balance between promoting the public
good and encouraging innovation. Different forms of expression
require different degrees of protection.
In 1964, the Copyright Office began accepting
registration of computer software as a "book."55 Ten years later,
Congress created the National Commission on New
work for hire term was extended in 1998 from seventy-five to ninety-five years due to,
many believe, pressure from Disney. Disney debuted Mickey Mouse in 1927 and had
much to gain from protecting him for another twenty years. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 23, 32 n.4 (2001); James Surowiecki, Righting Copywrongs, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 21, 2002, at 27.
60 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000) (library copies); § 112 (television broadcaster
copies); § 117 (archival and maintenance copies of a computer program).
5' Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 603(a), 104 Stat.
5128 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). This provision allows
certain classes of artists to prevent inter alia derivative use of their work. 17 U.S.C. §
106A (2000).
52 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). A work for hire occurs when an employee creates a
work for an employer. The employer then holds exclusively all rights to the work. 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (2001).
LITMAN, supra note 49, at 22-34. Professor Litman argues that public
interests consistently were left out of the negotiation process because Congress called
together the directly interested parties, e.g., libraries and publishers, but failed to
include an advocate for the public's rights. Id. at 23-25, 35-69.
Id. at 180-81 (arguing that the bright line rules are illusory and the Act
should be replaced with a case-by-case standard based on an exclusive right of
commercial exploitation). Any "rule" within the Copyright Act should be read in light of
the overall scheme. This allows courts to apply those rules in furtherance of the Act's
overall policy objectives-promoting learning and compensating authors to encourage
innovation. The Federal Circuit in Xerox failed to do this by narrowly focusing on the
grant of exclusive rights rather than the overall copyright scheme. Xerox, 203 F.3d
1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
'5 UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1964), reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 361
(1964). A work was not protected unless registered, and registration was limited to
specified types of works. When copyrightability of a work was in doubt, the Copyright
Office policy was to provide registration. No category existed in 1964 for computer
programs, so the Copyright Office used the broadest category, "books," to provide
protection. Id.
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Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") to
examine technological advances and make recommendations as
to how federal law should handle these developments.56 The
legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that software was
copyrightable under the literary works category. 7 However,
Congress awaited CONTU's findings as to which intellectual
property regime was ultimately best suited for software
protection. 8 The CONTU panel concluded that copyright law
should provide the principal means of legal protection for
computer software.59
Congress followed CONTU's recommendation in its
1980 amendments to the Copyright Act.6" The 1980
amendments added software to the literary work category
because software expresses information in "words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia."6 ' Software
consists of two expressions, source code and object code."2
Source code is the instruction for what a programmer wants a
program to do.63 Object code is the binary sequence, the ls and
Os, that a computer reads to perform the intended function.'
Translators within a computer transfer the source code to
object code. 6 Thus, software text is not read in the same way,
Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849, 6854.
67 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1976). See also H.R.
REP. No. 94-1733 (1976); H.R.
REP No. 1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 ("'[L]iterary
works' . . . includes . . . computer programs to the extent that they incorporate
authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the
ideas themselves."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1247 (3d Cir. 1983).
Weinreb, supra note 23, at 1165-67; Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs,Databases,and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New
Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 978, 979 (1993).
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works,
Final Report (1979), reprinted in COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC
RECORD, VOL. V: CONTU's FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Nicholas Henry
ed., 1980). The decision to protect software under copyright law puzzled some
commentators who found it contrary to the basic principle that a copyright does not
protect any "process, system [orl method of operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2001); Peter
S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329,
1330 (1987).
60 17 U.S.C. §§
101, 102(a)(1), 117 (2001). These amendment clarified
ambiguity found in the 1976 Act by defining a computer program and carving out an
exception for copies made for archival purposes. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2001).
61 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(1) (2001).
62 Cass, supra note 41, at 43-44; Menell, supra note 59, at 1334.
11Cass, supra note 41, at 43-44; Menell, supra note 59, at 1334.
64 Cass, supra note 41, at 43-44; Menell, supra note 59, at 1334.
65 Menell, supra note 59, at 1334. CONTU recommended

and Congress
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or for the same purpose, as a traditional literary work.
Consumers value software text for what it does, not what it
says. As one group of commentators said, "[n]o one would want
to buy a [computer] program that did not behave, i.e., that did
nothing, no matter how elegant the source code 'prose'
expressing that nothing."6
Despite fierce debate among commentators as to
whether the copyright regime is an appropriate means of
protecting computer software, copyright protection for software
is here to stay.67 Protecting software as a literary work,
however, created a legal mismatch.6 8 The Copyright Act
acknowledges some of the differences between software and
traditional literary works, and specifies different rules for
each. 6 Yet, the Act fails to address most of the important legal
and practical differences between software and traditional
literary works. Since copyright prohibits protection for a
process or function, it often leaves the most valuable part of
software unprotected. ° Conversely, because software is both
expression and function, "even the most closely circumscribed
definition of a computer program's protectible subject matter
will to some degree enable the copyright owner to monopolize
the programs function."7' Thus, the very nature of software
requires special rules to properly balance an author's rights
with the public good.7
approved copyright for both source and object code. Cass, supra note 41, at 43-44.
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2317 (1994).
67 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990)
[hereinafter Public Domain] (arguing that the public domain is vital to promoting
authorship and protecting copyright as a property right endangers this); Samuelson et
al., supra note 66 (advocating a sui generis regime for computer programs); Weinreb,
supra note 23 (discussing the inadequacy of the copyright rules to handle functional
expression). Cf Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Software Copyright:
Sliding Scales and Abstracted Expression, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 317 (1995) (arguing that
while software and copyright are a mismatch, copyright law contains the tools to
accommodate the differences); Miller, supra note 58 (maintaining that copyright law is
the proper means to protect software).
"Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling a jigsaw
puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit." Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d
807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995). See also Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 67. But see Miller,
supra note 58, at 982-85 (arguing that computer programs are quite similar to
traditional literary works and protecting them as such was sound judgment).
69 Such limitations include the ability to make an essential, archival or
maintenance copy of a computer program. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) & (c) (2001).
70 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The patent statute provides protection for original
processes and functions. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-103.
71 Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 67, at 332 (quoting Paul Goldstein).
72 Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)
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Traditional literary works rarely have software's dual
nature.73 Literary works that combine function with expression,
e.g., a "how-to" book, do not present the same legal difficulties
because the expression is still valued over the function.
Copyright of a "how-to fix watches" book protects the author's
description of watch repair, but does not protect the watch
repair process.74 Anyone who reads the book can use the
information communicated to repair a watch without risking
liability.75 In contrast, how-to, diagnostic software performs a
function, namely "speaking" with the object's parts to diagnose
the problem. A separate manual, similar to the how-to book, is
then needed to complete the repair." The software's copyright
protects the code that instructs the function. Only a computer
can read the software's code.77 A computer reading the code
necessarily performs the code's diagnostic function.78 Hence, the
software copyright protects the software's code and its
function. 9 The Copyright Act's current version fails to account
for this difference. The result is that an owner of a software
copyright has greater rights than the owner of a traditional
literary work.
The manner of dissemination further complicates the
difference between a how-to book and diagnostic software. The
how-to book author generally grants the right to print, publish
and sell the work to a publisher, who then prints and
distributes the work. ° Effectively, this separates the intangible
right, the copyright, from the tangible right, the physical copy. 8'
(stating that computer programs, because of their "highly functional, utilitarian"
nature, are protected less than other literary works); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-25 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that copyrighted works receive
different levels of protection based on their nature and that as a hybrid work, computer
software receives less than other literary works).
71 See Samuelson et al., supra note 66, at 2347 n.145.
74 Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 67, at 332-33. Whether
a consumer
would read it for its prose alone is debatable. Regardless, the book is completely
divorced of its function.
71 Id. at

332.

76 This manual, of course, is simply a type of how-to book. However, manuals

differ from how-to books in that they are written by manufacturers for specific
products. A manual author, generally a corporation, has a limited, easily targeted
market for her work, unlike a how-to book author who must compete to secure a
publisher and find an audience among similar works.
" Cass, supra note 41, at 43-44; Menell, supra note 59, at 1334.
78 Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra
note 67, at 332.
79 Id.

80See LITMAN, supra note 49, at 16; Breyer, supra note 46, at 294-308.
81 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2001).
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The author retains control over the copyright and the consumer
gains control over the physical copy. 2 Once the work is sold,
anyone with an interest in watch repair can buy a copy and use
the information it contains without further permission from the
author. 3
In contrast, software is generally licensed, which allows
the author to maintain control over both the copyright and the
physical copy.' The software author directly controls who can
read the work and under what terms. Anyone who uses a
computer to read the diagnostic software information to make a
repair risks liability, unless the software copyright holder
grants specific permission. Thus, an author who licenses,
rather than sells, a work maintains the same, in fact more,
copyright protection than the author of a book, while the public
loses protection of its rights to use the work."
Licensing increases the copyright holder's control over
the physical copy. This limits dissemination of the work and
restricts the public domain." In this way, licensing software
skews the balance between rewarding the author and
protecting the public good. The author profits from the license,
but the public loses some of its access rights to the work.
Allowing the copyright holder to unilaterally refuse to license a
work, as recent cases have,87 disrupts the balance even further.
HENN ON COPYRIGHT LAW: A
82 See generally HARRY G. HENN,
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 7.1 (3d ed. 1991).
LITMAN, supra note 49, at 16; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 67, at 33233.
84 The difference in manner of dissemination is, of course, simply the
difference between a sale and a license. A license provides the author with ongoing
control over that representation of the work, whereas a sale extinguishes an author's
right in the tangible form of the work. The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act's ("UCITA"), proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B, further
complicates the difference in dissemination methods by allowing copyright holders to
expand their rights through contract law. UCITA is beyond the scope of this article, but
for a discussion of its impact on intellectual property see Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111
(1999).
For instance, the first sale doctrine does not apply to licenses. 17 U.S.C. §
109. See also Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 2000 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (stating that only actual sale, not a license, triggers the first sale doctrine).
Even if computer software is sold, an exception to the first sale doctrine exists to
prohibit its rental. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a).
See generally Litman, Public Domain, supra note 67; L. Ray Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Free
Speech].
87 See Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman
Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994); Tricom v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 902
F. Supp. 741, 742-44 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
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Refusing to license a work prevents any dissemination of the
expression or the physical copy. This discourages learning from
the work, at least until copyright protection ends, and it
precludes an author from profiting."
III.

STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING REFUSALS TO LICENSE
COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Commentators and courts have begun to describe
copyright law in terms of an author's control over her work. 9
This categorization disturbs the purpose and reality of
copyright law. Once copyright ceases to be a bargain between
the public and an author, and instead becomes "the right of a
property owner to protect what is rightfully hers ... allow[ing]
us to skip right past the question of what it is, exactly, that
ought to be rightfully hers,"" the public's rights, the basis for
granting the protection, are forgotten.
The Federal Circuit's Xerox decision exemplifies this
problem.9 The case involved Xerox's refusal to sell or license
diagnostic software and replacement parts to Independent
Service Organizations ("ISOs"), whose business was to service
high-speed copiers and printers.92 Xerox implemented a "parts
policy" in 1984 under which it refused to sell parts to ISOs who
were not also end users of the product." The policy went largely
unenforced until 1989 when Xerox cut off supplies to the six
most successful ISOs.94 In 1991, Xerox unbundled the service
manuals and diagnostic software from the copier and printer
operating systems and used the copyrights on these to restrict
Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 86, at 6-7.
89 Professor Litman categorizes the evolution of the last 100 years of
copyright law in terms of the metaphors used to describe the law. LITMAN, supra note
49, at 77-88. At the turn of the last century, copyright was described as a quid pro quo:
the public granted authors exclusive rights to gain immediate dissemination and
eventual free use. As the century progressed and Congress relaxed formal
requirements, copyright was described as compensation: authors needed copyright to
earn enough money to create more works. This evolved to an economic metaphor of
incentives: copyright is needed to foster innovation. Today, copyright is described in
terms of control. Id. at 78-81. The current metaphor discusses copyright in terms of a
property that owners can "sell to the public (or refuse to sell) on whatever terms the
owner chooses." Id. at 81.
9' Id. at 81.
91 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
92 Id. at 1324.
93

Id.

94 In

re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (Dec. 22 Decision), 989 F. Supp.

1131, 1133 (D. Kan. 1997).
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ISO access to them.95 A class of ISOs brought suit in 1994,
which settled.96 A group of ISOs involved in this case opted out
of the settlement to file their own action against Xerox.97 The
ISOs claimed that Xerox's unilateral refusal to sell or license
its copyrighted material violated the Sherman Act by
precluding them from competing in the service market." Xerox
counterclaimed copyright infringement against the ISOs. 9' The
district court granted summary judgment for Xerox, holding
that absent unlawful acquisition of the copyright a unilateral
refusal to license a copyrighted work, regardless of intent, does
not violate1 the Sherman Act, even if the refusal harms
consumers. 00
In Xerox, the Federal Circuit was left to decide how the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit would likely rule on the
copyright claim after finding that neither the Tenth Circuit,
nor the Supreme Court, had directly addressed whether a
unilateral refusal to license copyrighted expression implicated
antitrust regulations.' ' After reviewing decisions from other
circuits that considered the issue, the Federal Circuit found the
First Circuit's reasoning to be the most persuasive.' 2 In Data
General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., the First
Circuit held that "while exclusionary conduct can include a
monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an
author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyright work
is a presumptively valid business justification for any
immediate harm to consumers."10' 3 The court in Data General
95 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (Mar. 21 Decision), 964
F. Supp.

1469, 1472 (D. Kan. 1997).
9 Dec. 22 Decision, 989 F. Supp. at 1133.
97 id.
98 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324. The patent aspects of the case
are beyond the
scope of this article. For a discussion of these aspects of the case, see Jacobs & Mireles,
supra note 1, at 294-95; James B. Kobak, Jr., The Federal Circuit as a CompetitionLaw
Court, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 527 (2001); Oettinger, supra note 10.
99 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1324.
100Id.
101Id. at 1328. The case was properly before the Federal Circuit, as that court
has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994). Thus,
Federal Circuit law applied to the patent claims .and Tenth Circuit law applied to the
copyright claims. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1325.
102 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1328-29. See also Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys.
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186-90 (1st Cir. 1994). The court, however, failed to take
into account the Microsoft case. There, Judge Jackson found that copyright law did not
give Microsoft absolute discretion to license, or not license, its works. United States v.
Microsoft, 98-CV-1232, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231, at *49 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998)
affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part by 253 F.3d 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
103 Data Gen., 36 F.3d
at 1187.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 2

0
placed the burden on the plaintiff to rebut that presumption.!
Following this reasoning, the Federal Circuit held that "Xerox's
refusal to sell or license its copyrighted works was squarely
within the rights granted by Congress" and did not violate the
antitrust laws.'0 5
The Ninth Circuit reached a different result based on
strikingly similar facts in Image Technical Services, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co."6 That court followed the First Circuit's
reasoning, but with a modification.' 7 It ruled that evidence of
pretext could be used to rebut the presumption that a refusal to
license was a presumptively valid business decision.'
The
court held that Kodak had used its intellectual property grants
as a mask for anti-competitive conduct, thus requiring Kodak
to license its software and parts to ISOs. 10 9 The Ninth Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's statement in a previous Kodak
case that "[tihe Court has held many times that power gained
through some . .. legal advantage such as a . .. copyright...
can give rise to liability . .. 0
The Federal Circuit in Xerox agreed that copyright does
"not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.""' The
Id. Only the rare cases of unlawful acquisition or illegal tying were deemed
likely to prevail in rebutting the presumption.
105 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329. The war between Xerox and service providers
104

continues:
After nearly ten years of litigation, millions of dollars in attorneys' fees and
numerous court orders including a final order of dismissal earlier this year,
this case now boils down to the choice between (1) a settlement which
requires CSU to pay $1.4 million over five years at 8.5% interest and (2) a
settlement which requires CSU to pay $1.4 million over two years at 8.5%
interest. Xerox-a Fortune 500 corporation with numerous worldwide
affiliates-has decided to re-load its litigation weapons to force CSU-a
company which annually purchases more than $5 million in Xerox copier
parts and pays $1 million in Xerox license fees-to accept the latter choice or
file for bankruptcy. Basic finance and business principles, as well as common
sense, would appear to dictate against such a strategy. This dispute
apparently must proceed, however, because it involves Xerox's arch-enemy in
the copier service industry-CSU.
CSU v. Xerox Corp., 202 F.R.D. 275, 276 (D. Kan. 2001).
106 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). After ISOs
began competing against Kodak
to service their machines, Kodak restricted access to patented parts and copyrighted
material to buyers who use Kodak services or repair their own machines. This forced
some consumers to switch to Kodak for service even though the ISOs were less
expensive and provided better service. Id. at 1200-01.
107

Id. at 1218-19.

108

Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1219-20.

109

"0 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29
(1992).
. Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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court, however, failed to acknowledge that copyright, as a
statutorily granted right, is limited. 112 The statutory grant
provided the "legal advantage" to which the Supreme Court
previously referred.11 The Federal Circuit's finding that an
unlimited right to exclude is "squarely" within the statutory
grant ignored the purpose of the statute: to promote learning
and innovation by providing an author with protection."' The
statute, when read as a whole, indicates that the right to
exclude has limits."5 The Federal Circuit erred in not
determining the proper scope of the right.
IV.

SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE

This Section explores the Federal Circuit's basis in
Xerox for broadening the right to exclude and the policies that
support copyright. The Federal Circuit's basis proves to be a
wobbly pedestal on which to construct an absolute right. This is
due, in part, to the court's reliance on dictum from a Lochner
era case."' It is also due to the Federal Circuit's failure to
recognize the dual policies behind the copyright lawprotecting authors and promoting learning-that must be
balanced.
A.

Refusal to License Cases: The Faulty Rationalefor an
UnlimitedRight to Exclude

Recall that Xerox starts with the proposition that a
copyright owner may, in his discretion, refuse to license or sell
a copyrighted work."1 This reasoning relies on dictum from a
...
Id. at 1329. Finding that a copyright holder exceeded the copyright grant
and issuing an injunction may be easier for courts than finding that the same behavior
violated the antitrust laws, which carry treble damages.
...Kodak, 504 U.S. at 479 n.29.
...
Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329.
"1 For instance, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001) sets forth the exclusive rights of
authors, but subjects them to the exceptions in §§ 107-122. To read the grant in § 106
as absolute unless a specific exemption is provided ignores the overall balancing
scheme the Act attempts to achieve, and that the Constitution requires.
"" The dictum comes from Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932). See also
infra note 125 and accompanying text.
"7 Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 (1st
Cir. 1994); Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th
Cir. 1997); Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1328. At first glance, this appears to be a relatively
benign statement. But if this statement were true then all of the power would reside
with an author, who could then decide if the progress of the art should be furthered or
not.
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1932 Supreme Court case, Fox Film v. Doyal."5 In Fox Film,
the Court held that Congress created a new right granting

property to an author, not to the federal government." 9 The
Court went on to say that if a copyright owner wished, he "may
refrain from vending or licensing and content himself with

simply exercising
the right to exclude others from using his
20
property.'

Many problems exist with the Federal Circuit's
wholesale adoption of the principle contained in the Fox Film
quote.' 2' Quite possibly, this quote had a specific contextual
meaning, given that Fox Film was a tax case. 22 The sentences
preceding that quote stated that Congress neither reserved any
interest for the government, nor provided that the right created
should be tax free. 22 Thus, one interpretation is that the Court
was simply pointing out that if Fox wanted to forego the state
tax, it could refrain from licensing its films in Georgia.
However, the language "content himself with simply exercising
the right to exclude
others from using his property" points to a
124
broader meaning.
The better explanation for the quote appears to be the
context in which it was decided. Fox Film was a Lochner era

decision,'25 and this little-noted

118

fact colors its meaning.

286 U.S. 123 (1932). Fox Film concerned whether copyrights were federal

instruments and as such immune from state taxation. Id. at 126. Georgia charged a tax
on the gross royalties from the license of a film. Id. Fox unsuccessfully argued that
since the federal government granted copyright it was immune from the state tax. Id.
119 Id. at 127.
120 Id.
121

Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1328.

122Fox Film, 286 U.S. 123.
121

Id. at 127.

124

Id.

125 The Lochner Court was so named for its 1905 decision in Lochner v. New

York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down a state law limiting the maximum hours a
baker could work on the ground that the law impermissibly interfered with the
employer and employee's liberty of contract. See also Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525, 545 (1923) ("Included in the right of personal liberty and the right of private
property-partaking of the nature of each-is the right to make contracts for the
acquisition of property."). I invoke the so-called "ghost of Lochner" here not to vilify the
decision but to shed light on what Chief Justice Hughes meant in his discussion of
copyright in the case. The label simply captures a discrete value set that informed
Supreme Court jurisprudence of the period. While many commentators decry the
Lochner cases as "constitutionally improper," others argue that they were consistent
with and evolved constitutional jurisprudence. Cf., e.g., Michael Les Benedict, LaissezFaire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293 (1985), with Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudenceand the American ConstitutionalTradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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Supreme Court decisions from this era 26 are notable for their
emphasis on the supremacy of private property and freedom of
contract. 127 Laissez-faire economics and social contract theory
12
influenced the nature of property rights during this period.
Through its decisions, the Court promulgated the belief that
government should let the "natural" laws of supply and29
demand govern markets without unnecessary interference.
Class-specific legislation that redistributed property was
presumptively invalid as an impediment to economic liberty.'
Copyright, as a type of property, was not immune from such
beliefs.
While the Lochner Court continued to hold that
copyright was wholly statutory,13 ' the Court viewed the
copyright statute as both enhancing and restraining an
author's common law property rights.2 2 The statute enhanced
rights because it held market participants to terms to which
they had not agreed."3 It forced participants to negotiate and
gave special benefits to one side, copyright holders, rather than
allowing market forces to bring parties together and exercise
unfettered contract liberties.' To combat the statute's effects,
the Court narrowly read the Copyright Act and refused
opportunities to expand it.' For instance, in Bobbs-Merrill Co.
126 The Lochner era generally is defined from 1870-1937. Siegel, supra note

125, at 4 n.9. This article focuses on cases from 1905-1937.
127 See G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's
Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 88 (1997). See also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1 (1915) (striking down a law that prohibited employers from refusing to let employees
join unions because it interfered with private property and liberty rights). For an
interesting view that Lochner doctrine is alive and well in the shaping of modern
cyberspace law see Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic
Orthodoxy of "RightsManagement," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998).
128 Benedict, supra note 125, at 298; White, supra note 127, at 88.
129 Cohen, supra note 127, at 469.
130 Id.
at 470. Under this theory, class specific laws were valid if they
protected those who were unable to exercise their liberty rights, i.e., those without
bargaining power or "wards of the state." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908)
(upholding a law limiting the hours women could work because "there is that in [a
woman's] disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of
[her liberty] rights"). See also Benedict, supra note 125, at 305-11.
131 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); White-Smith Music
Publ'g. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15 (1908).
132 See generally White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
result [of this decision] is to give copyright less scope than its rational significance...
."); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 362-65 (1908) (holding that the
statutory remedies contract an owner's rights).
3 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
134 See generally id.
135 See, e.g., White-Smith, 209 U.S. 1; Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. 339. Justice
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v. Straus, the copyright holder argued that the right "to vend"
8 6 The Court
included the ability to dictate future sales terms."
held that the right to vend did not allow copyright owners who
sold books wholesale to dictate subsequent prices."7 The Court
noted that to do so would impose a limitation on purchasers
who were not in privity of contract with the copyright holder,
i.e., who had not bargained for those terms.'38
In perhaps the most controversial copyright case of the
period, White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., the
Court narrowly construed the statute to protect a developing
industry from feared monopolistic pricing.3 9 In White-Smith,
the Court held that a piano roll did not infringe music
composers' copyrights because the perforated sheets were not
copies of the sheet music. 4 ° The opinion noted the impressive
growth of the piano roll industry.'' It characterized the case as
important because it involved the piano roll industry's "large
property interests" while "touching" upon rights of composers
and publishers.' The Court then narrowly defined "copy" as "a
written or printed record ... in intelligible notation."'43 Since
humans could not read the perforated sheets in question, they
were not copies, and thus not protected by the statute. ' The
ruling protected the piano roll industry from the expense of
paying for the music played on its machines.' If the perforated
Holmes wrote the only opinion that expanded copyrights during this period. Kalem Co.
v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (holding that a film dramatization of scenes from
"Ben Hur" infringed the author's copyright). Holmes deftly categorized the infringing
motion picture as a "well known form of reproduction" to overcome the problem of
whether a film "copied" a book, so that the Court could not find Congress at fault for
not including it in the statute. Id. at 63. The Supreme Court did, however, go to lengths
to protect profitable businesses where copyright did not. See Int'l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-41 (1918) (holding that news gathering was quasi
property and enjoining INS from using AP stories without its permission).
136 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 343.
137 Id.
at 350-51.
138

Id.

139 White-Smith,

209 U.S. 1. See generally Paul S. Rosenlund, Compulsory

Licensing of Musical Compositions for Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1979).
140 White-Smith, 209 U.S.
at 13-14.
141 Id. at 9-10.
142

Id. at 9.

143

Id. at 17.

14 Id. at 18.
145

In the 1909 Act, Congress specifically granted copyright holders control

over mechanical reproductions of music. Act of March 4, 1909, § 1(e), reprinted in
BOWKER, supra note 16, at app. I. Congress also recognized the fear of monopoly
pricing and included the compulsory license as a remedy. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 9
(1909). See also Harry Henn, The Compulsory License Provision of the U.S. Copyright
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sheets were copies within the statute, music publishers could
charge monopoly prices on the music, threatening the
industry's growth.
The Copyright Act also restrained rights by limiting
available remedies and duration of the rights.'46 Congress not
only created a new right when it enacted the Copyright Act, it
also created the specific remedies for that right.'47 For example,
under the pre-1909 Copyright Act, the penalty for infringement
of copyright in a map was the destruction of plates and copies,
and damages, one half of which went to the federal
government.' Congress revised the Copyright Act in 1909 but
specified that for infringement "in lieu of actual damages ...
such damages as to the court shall appear to be just.., but...
such damages shall in no other case exceed . . . five thousand
dollars nor be less than . . . two hundred and fifty dollars." 49
The Lochner Court found these remedies "[i]nadequate . . . to
fully protect the property in the copyright." 5 ° The Court
granted judges as much discretion as possible under the
statute to decide damage amounts.'
Moreover, the balance between the author's rights and
the public good fundamentally shifted during the Lochner era.
Earlier nineteenth century caselaw recognized that the law
needed to balance individual rights with the public good;
authors should be compensated for their efforts and the public
should not be deprived the resulting improvements. 12 By 1908,
Law, SUB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES PREPARED FOR
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, at 3 (Comm. Print

1960), reprinted in 1 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G.
Grossman ed., 1960). This compulsory license continues today at 17 U.S.C. § 115
(2002).
146 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356, 365-66 (1908) (describing §§
4963-67 and 4370 as specifying specific remedies). Under the first Copyright Act,
copyright existed for fourteen years from the time of first publication and could be
renewed for an additional fourteen years. Act of May 31, 1790, reprinted in SOLBERG,
supra note 20, at 32-34. The copyright term under the 1909 Act was for twenty eight
years from the time of first publication with a renewal term of twenty eight years. Act
of March 4, 1909, § 24, reprinted in BOWKER, supra note 16, at 475-77.
147Globe Newspaper Co., 210 U.S. at 365.
148 Id. at 366.
149See, e.g., Act of March 4, 1909, § 25(b), reprintedin BOWKER, supra note 16,
at 475-76.

150 Globe Newspaper Co., 210 U.S. at 364.

...Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (allowing the trier of fact
discretion in measuring the damage amount so long as within the statutory
boundaries).
15' Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 765 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580) (quoting
Lord Mansfield). See also Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1858) ( "[Tihe limited
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this changed. The Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill found that
the "main purpose" of the copyright law was to secure the
benefit of the author.' The Court used the 1790 Act's title, "an
act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies..
. to the authors," as evidence of the primacy of the individual
right."' That interpretation failed to recognize that securing
the individual's right was a means to the goal of increased
public learning and did not survive the era."'
The Fox Film decision is actually the only Lochner era
case to acknowledge the proper balance of the copyright
statute. Chief Justice Hughes stated in Fox Film that "[t]he
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors."" 6 Hughes cited a 1858
patent case that stated that an "inventor who designedly ...
and exclusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from
the public, comes not within the policy or objects of the
Constitution or acts of Congress. He does not promote, and, if
aided in his design, would impede, the progress of sciences and
the useful arts."'5 7 This acknowledgement of the public good
makes the Federal Circuit's broad reading in the Xerox opinion
of the Fox Film quote that a copyright owner may arbitrarily
exclude others'5 8 even more dubious. Essentially, the Federal
Circuit's interpretation of the Fox Film quote authorizes an
author to withhold his creation from the public, impeding the
utilitarian policies that support the copyright grant.

and temporary monopoly granted . . . was never designed for [an author's] exclusive
profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or community at large was another and
doubtless the primary object in granting and securing that monopoly.").
153 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 347 (1908). See also
Bong v.
Alfred S. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236, 246 (1909) ("[T]he statute must be read in
the light of the intention of Congress to protect these intangible rights as a reward of
the inventive genius that has produced the work.") (internal quotation omitted).
"' Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 347. Further evidence of the shift in balance can
be found in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907). There, the
Court used a law dictionary for the definition of a copyright, including "the foundation
of all rights of this description is the natural dominion which every one has over his
own ideas, the enjoyment of which, although they are embodied in visible forms or
characters, he may, if he chooses, confine to himself or impart to others." Id. at 291
(citation omitted). This definition clearly was at odds with the statutory right to vend
and publish copies of a work for a limited period of time.
"' United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The
copyright law.., makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328.

158 Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also, supra notes 117-30.
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In all fairness to the Federal Circuit, it borrowed the
Fox Film language from the First Circuit's Data General
decision, which cited the Supreme Court case of Stewart v.
Abend for the unlimited right to exclude position.'59 Justice
O'Connor, in Stewart, stretched the Fox Film quote to its
limits, stating: "nothing in the copyright statutes would
prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the
term of the copyright... this Court has held that a copyright
owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license."' While
courts cited Fox Film frequently from 1932 to 1990 for its tax
holding and the copyright balancing language, no court cited it
to justify the arbitrary right of a copyright owner to hoard his
works. 6' Further, the Stewart use of the language from Fox
Film is inappropriate on at least two points. First, Fox Film did
not hold that an author had a right to hoard; it was a tax case,
and therefore that line was merely dictum. 6" Second, numerous
other provisions within the copyright statute, e.g., fair use 6 '
and compulsory licenses,"M prevent an author from hoarding
his work. Moreover, the Constitution specifies that the purpose
of congressional power to grant copyrights is to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.
It is possible, since the question in Stewart concerned
licensing for the renewal term, that Justice O'Connor meant
that an author could hoard the right of renewal.'65 This narrow
interpretation would be more in keeping with constitutional
goals, because the work would already have been published
and any further progress during the renewal period would be
159495 U.S. 207 (1990). See also Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1328; and Data
Gen. Corp.
v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
160 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29 (citing Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127).
161 For the tax cases see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 578 (1946);

and Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 481 (1939). For the copyright cases see Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); and Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214
(1954).
...See Kauffman, supra note 16, at 413.
163

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).

164

17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d), 115, 116.

165 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 211. The writer of the story on which Hitchcock based

the film Rear Window promised to assign his renewal term rights to the filmmakers,
but died before the renewal term commenced. The writer's estate renewed the
copyright pursuant to § 24 of the 1909 Act and assigned it to Abend, who sued for
infringement when the film was broadcast on television during the renewal period. Id.
at 211-15. The Court held that the filmmakers' rights expired after the initial twentyeight year term and any further use of the film without a license for the underlying
story infringed the story's copyright owner's rights. Id. at 223-26.
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minimal. If authors were allowed to hoard their works at any
time, however, progress certainly would not be promoted." It is
difficult to promote progress if a work is not disseminated to
the public. Justice O'Connor indicated that the statutory term
limit is adequate to promote progress.167 Yet, as copyright
terms increase this provides rather flaccid protection.168
B.

Policies Behind the Right to Exclude

If the right to exclude permits an author to withhold his
work, then "science and the useful arts" will not progress.'69
Exclusive rights are granted to an author to spur progress. 170
"[Clopyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas
" ' The Federal Circuit's
and information conveyed by a work."17
decision in Xerox that the right to exclude includes the absolute
right to withhold permits application of the right to eclipse its
purpose. 172
The bundle of rights involved in a copyright grants an
author a period of time free from competition, in which the
costs of creating the protected expression can be recouped.17
This financial incentive encourages authors to continue
creating. The Supreme Court recognized this policy in Mazer v.
Stein, stating:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and
useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
174
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.

16 Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 86, at 7.

7 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29.
' For instance, the Microsoft operating system, Windows 95, will not fall into
the public domain until 2090. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (copyright in a work made for hire
subsists for ninety-five years). By that time it will long be obsolete.
169Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 86, at 7 ("[L]earning requires access
to
the work in which the ideas to be learned are embodied . . .there can be no access
without distribution.").
170 "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but '[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
171 Id. at 349-50.
172

Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

171

See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 14.

174

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953). See also supra note 14.
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Allowing an author to hoard a work is contrary to this policy. 7 '
If the work is not in use, then it is not enhancing public welfare
and cannot be compensated.'76
The exclusive right encourages creativity while also
affording the author's work adequate protection. However, the
exclusive grant also carries social costs. If the grant is too
broad, it discourages other authors from furthering the
innovation. Allowing competition lowers costs, increases
variety, choice and efficiency and improves quality. As
Professor Chafee noted:
The protection given the copyright-owner should not stifle
independent creation by others. Nobody else should market the
author's book, but we refuse to say nobody else should use it. The
world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our
predecessors. "A dwarf standing
on the shoulders of a giant can see
" 1 77
farther than the giant himself.

When the giant denies access to those shoulders everyone
suffers from the resulting vision loss. Precluding competition
stifles creativity and prevents the introduction of new ideas,
thereby decreasing the public good and discouraging individual
efforts.
Rather than encourage competition, however, copyright
laws are becoming ratchet like.Y Congress and the courts
continue to increase the copyright holders' rights at the public's
expense.17' Due to industry lobbying, the terms are getting
longer, penalties are growing and exceptions are shrinking. 8 °
Assuming that there is a finite amount of intellectual property
protection that will promote innovation, any protection beyond
that point will decrease innovation. Once that point is reached,
175 See generally Patterson,
178
177

Free Speech, supra note 86.
Id. at 7.
Zachariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on Copyright Law, 45 COLUM. L. REV.

503, 511 (1945).
178 David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and
Stability in Antitrust Law,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 778 (2001).
179 LITMAN, supra note
49, at 80.
180 McGowan, supra note
178,

at 778 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook,
Cyberspace Versus Property Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 108 (1999) [hereinafter
Cyberspace]); Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998) (extending
copyright terms); and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201
(narrowing the exception for reverse engineering)). Criminal sanctions for copyright
infringement also continue to grow. See, e.g., No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 17, 18, & 28 U.S.C.).
Acceptance of proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B also would allow a
copyright holder to expand his rights through contract law. See Lemley, supra note 84.
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reduced innovation can be ameliorated by licensing the
protected work to other innovators.18 ' If the copyright holder
refuses to license, however, she creates a holdout problem and
stifles innovation. Without a mechanism to alleviate the
holdout problem, exclusivity will promote stagnation rather
than progress.
To prevent the holdout problem, exclusivity should be
limited to use.'82 Copyright holders such as Xerox would argue
that they were using their protected expression, they simply
prohibited others from also using it. However, such use does
little to promote the useful arts or competition. The idea behind
software can be kept secret if not disseminated. Diagnostic
software is not "published" like a patent, thus an independent
service provider could not improve on the idea. Further, the
service provider could not employ its own creativity to compose
different software that performs the same function because
Xerox controls the machine on which the software works.
"Use," in the software sense, should then mean allowing others
access to the software, allowing the ISO dwarves to stand on
the giant's, Xerox, shoulders. Only through access will others
upon the product and
have the opportunity to improve
83
simultaneously foster competition.

V.

COMPULSORY LICENSING FOR SOFTWARE

Where copyright holders refuse to license software,
compulsory licenses present a mechanism to maintain the
proper balance between public access and copyright
protection."M A compulsory license allows an individual access
to a copyrighted work so long as a royalty fee is paid to the
work's owner. 88 Such a process promotes the dual policies of
181McGowan, supra note 178, at 778.
182

S. Delvalle Goldsmith, The Case for "Restricted"Compulsory Licensing, 2

APLA Q. J. 146, 150-51 (1974).
18 Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 86, at 7-9.
For a thorough discussion of the compulsory licenses in the patent context,
including a discussion of international compulsory license provisions, see Joseph A.
Yosick, Note, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1275.
185 Cassler, supra note 46, at 232. While some have argued that compulsory
licenses are an unconstitutional limitation to an author's exclusive rights, Karl
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO.
L.J. 109, 116-17 (1929), the more accepted view is that the Constitution grants
Congress the power to determine the scope of copyright. 1 NIMMER, supra note 19, §
1.07. The constitutionality of the compulsory license provisions has never been
challenged. Cassler, supra, at 237. However, the Wheaton case provided an indication
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copyright law because it allows dissemination of the work and
the copyright holder to profit.
Both Congress and the courts can authorize a
compulsory license. Amending the copyright statute is the
clearest method to create a compulsory license.186 An
amendment has the benefit of uniformity and predictability.'8 7
However, statutory compulsory licenses are inflexible and fail
to account for geographic differences in price.'88 Alternatively,
courts can also use their equity powers to require compulsory
licenses.'89 While a judicial compulsory license is less
predictable than a statute, it can take into account specific
industry conditions and tailor fees. Such flexibility would
benefit the dynamic nature of the software market while
maintaining the appropriate balance between the holder and
the public. Additionally, as courts apply compulsory licenses,
more predictability would emerge.
Generally, Congress and the courts limit the use of
compulsory licenses to special circumstances where the license
can curb monopolistic practices and alleviate high transaction
costs.' Compulsory licenses are not necessary for all or even
most copyrighted works. Basic economics instructs that when
willing buyers and willing sellers exist in a competitive market,
normal bargaining and legal regimes will foster deals. 9 ' Cases
involving refusals to license software, like Xerox, however, are
different. These cases involve unwilling sellers in noncompetitive markets. The markets are non-competitive not by
that the compulsory licenses are constitutional with the comment that "[n]o one can
deny that when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or an
inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be
enjoyed...." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663-64 (1834).
18 For a discussion of the existing compulsory licensing
provisions in the
Copyright Act see Cassler, supra note 46.
187 Goldsmith, supra note 182, at 153.
'88 Cassler, supra note 46, at 253.
189 See Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.
1997); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974) (awarding
reasonable royalty fees rather than granting injunctive relief). Administrative agencies
also can order compulsory licenses. See, e.g., In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373
(1975) (granting a compulsory license for office copiers).
," See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (record companies), 115 (cable television), 118
(satellite carriers) and 119 (public broadcasting). See also Cassler, supra note 46, at
249-53; Aram Dobalian, Note, Copyright Protection For the Non-Literal Elements of
Computer Programs: The Need For Compulsory Licensing, 15 WHITrIER L. REV. 1019,
1066-70 (1994).
191 See Lee, supra note 22, at 211. For example, this was the world that
existed between Xerox and the ISOs prior to Xerox's refusal to license its products.
Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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natural market selection, but because of an artificially-imposed
legal regime: copyright law. Since copyright law created the
situation, it seems appropriate that it should also alleviate its
harmful effects.
In refusal to license software cases, a compulsory license
will prevent copyright holders from precluding competition in
ancillary service markets and increase consumer service
options. In addition, a statutory compulsory license will
alleviate the transaction costs of bargaining around the
different courts of appeal rules. 9 ' Further, a compulsory license
for software reduces the harshness of the copyright term.
Protecting computer software for ninety-five years is senseless
given the short useful life of a software program.'93 Finally, a
compulsory license for software supports wide dissemination of
information, an implicit goal of the copyright clause and the
First Amendment."' Since software at least partially protects
ideas in addition to expression, the First Amendment
implications are greater than with other copyrighted
materials.'95
The arguments against compulsory licenses are twofold.
Philosophically, opponents argue that compulsory licenses
interfere with property ownership. 9 ' Economically, opponents
maintain that compulsory licensing schemes are inefficient and
discourage creativity.'97 These economic arguments generally
focus on the royalty rate and copyright holders to the exclusion
of public policies behind copyright law.'98
Since copyright is a congressionally created right, it
does not carry the same privileges as real property
ownership.'99 Therefore, the philosophical argument that a
compulsory license constitutes a "taking" fails. What Congress
gives, it can take away. 2°° Further, while some individual
192

See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying text. See also Lee, supra note

22, at 223-24. Of course, judicially created compulsory licenses would not have this
effect.
193 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 302(a) & (c) (2001). See also supra note
168.
194 Cassler, supra note 46, at 242-44.
'9' Id. at 243. See also Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 86.
196 Cassler, supra note 46, at 242-43.
197 Easterbrook, Cyberspace, supra note 180 (arguing that we do not know
enough about intellectual property to propose new rules); Lee, supra note 22; Leroy
Whitaker, Compulsory Licensing-Another Nail in the Coffin, 2 APLA Q. J. 155, 163-65
(1974).
199 See generally Lee, supra note 22.
'9 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
200 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.07.
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authors can claim moral rights in their work and defend
against compulsory licensing on the ground that they need to
control their work to prevent distortions,2 °' software creators
are largely companies who do not hold such moral rights. 2° Any
"distortion" to software likely would entail improving the
software's unprotected function to work better, or at least
differently.
Economic opponents claim that compulsory licenses are
inefficient because they are an inflexible government control
that distorts the market."3 This school of thought defines
efficiency as exploitation of "economic resources in such a way
that 'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate
consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is
maximized."0 4 They argue that since a compulsory license is
involuntary it cannot reflect the true market price.2 5 This
argument fails on two levels. First, the degree to which a
compulsory license for software would distort the market
depends on how the fee is structured. 6 Congress or the courts
can designate that the parties bargain and the fee reflect
market price.2 7 In Xerox, since there was an ongoing market
prior to Xerox's refusal to license,2 8 the true market price
would be less difficult to determine than when no voluntary
market existed. Second, the market by its very nature is
distorted because it is based on an artificial right: copyright. A
compulsory license prevents that artificial distortion from
growing too large. Refusing to license does not reflect a true
market price because it eliminates competition. If only Xerox
can exploit the software, the service price will not reflect true
market "value" because a consumer would have little choice but
201 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2002). The moral rights provision is, however, limited to

works of visual art as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
202 See Lee, supra note 22, at 203 n.4. Even individual software creators would
not fit into the defined category of moral rights holders. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A
(2000).
...Lee, supra note 22; Whitaker, supra note 197, at 163-65.
204 Lee, supra note 22, at 211 (quoting RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 10 (2d ed. 1977)).
2o5 Id. at 193.
206 Cassler, supra note 46, at 252-55.
207 For instance,
17 U.S.C. § 116 (2000) instructs jukebox operators to
negotiate with copyright holders for appropriate fees. 2 NIMMER, supra note 19, §
8.17[c]. Tension between that particular compulsory license and the Berne Convention
necessitated change in the compulsory license, from a statutorily dictated fee to a
negotiated fee. Id.
208 Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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to pay the price Xerox demands. Thus, even if a compulsory
license imperfectly reflects market value, it is more efficient for
the end consumer than allowing Xerox to maintain a service
monopoly.
Opponents also argue that compulsory licenses
discourage creativity because they prohibit creators from
recouping their research and development costs.20 9 The
argument is that companies like Xerox need the excess profits
made from servicing their machines to recoup the research and
development costs incurred to create the machine and
diagnostic software. The ISOs offered service for less because
they did not have research costs. Allowing the ISOs to use the
software permits them to benefit from Xerox's labor and creates
a disincentive for Xerox to invest in future research and
development. This argument, however, fails for three
reasons."' First, the argument assumes that only Xerox is
entitled to benefit from its creation. Since the source of this
entitlement is copyright law, Xerox's incentive must be
balanced against the harm society incurs in granting the
right.211 While providing an incentive to create is vital, it is a
secondary concern in copyright law.212 Second, Xerox will
recoup research and development costs through the licensing
fees in addition to the fees it charges for service.212 The ISO's
service price will reflect the licensing fee, bringing it more in
line with Xerox's price. Finally, research and development costs
are far more likely to be recouped in the sale price of the
209 Easterbrook, Cyberspace, supra note 180, at 106; Lee, supra note 22, at

221; Whitaker, supra note 197, at 163-65.
"0 See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
470-79 (1992) (dismissing Kodak's similar arguments that raising prices in the service
aftermarkets would not make economic sense because consumers would buy less
equipment).
211 Congress, in discussing the new 1909 compulsory licensing provisions
observed:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded...
has been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his
[creation] . . . and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive
monopolies, which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the
[author] for the purpose of protecting his interests.
1909 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19, at S7; see also Weinreb, supra note 23, at
1215.
212 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[Clopyright
law . . . makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration.") (quoting United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
213 Again, a judicial compulsory license may be better suited to
allowing
parties to reach a reasonable fee. However, it would be less efficient because it raises
administrative and transaction costs.
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machine than in the service aftermarket. A software
compulsory licensing scheme balances both policies by
compensating the copyright holder and promoting the useful
arts.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional foundation of copyright law, as well
as subsequent congressional developments, support defining
the proper scope of an author's right to exclude. Defining this
scope requires maintaining the balance between promoting
public access and compensating innovation. The Federal
Circuit's decision in Xerox permits a copyright holder to hoard
his work.214 This tips the balance in favor of copyright holders
and promotes neither policy objective of copyright law.
Compulsory licenses present a measured and efficient method
for courts or Congress to strike the appropriate balance.
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...Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322, 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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